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A Constructive/ist Response to Glaser’s  
“Constructivist Grounded Theory?” 
Antony Bryant ∗ 
Abstract: Recent articles on the Grounded Theory Method 
(GTM) have started to analyze its conceptual and philoso-
phical foundations. In particular it has been argued that the 
early characterizations by GLASER and STRAUSS exhibit 
a scientistic and positivist orientation that is no longer ten-
able. In her recent contribution to the GTM literature, 
CHARMAZ distinguished between objectivist GTM and 
constructivist GTM. This drew a response from Barney 
GLASER. What follows is a rejoinder to GLASER, offering 
some clarification of developments in people’s understand-
ing of this important and widely-used qualitative approach. 
 
Having quite coincidentally, and initially unknowingly, written an article  
(BRYANT 2002) that deals with similar issues to those raised by CHARMAZ 
in her contribution to the Handbook of Qualitative Research (CHARMAZ 
2000), I was pleased to note that Barney GLASER had responded to her in his 
contribution “Constructivist Grounded Theory?” (published 2002 in FQS; 
reprinted in this volume).  
As I read GLASER’s response, however, my pleasure turned to dismay. In-
stead of a coherent response to a provocative and well-reasoned argument, I 
found an incoherent and inconsistent article formatted like a poor piece of 
tabloid journalism. (I have no reason to believe that GLASER did not endorse 
publication of the paper in its final version.)  
CHARMAZ’s argument can be stated in fairly simple terms. She distin-
guishes between objectivist and constructivist concepts of the Grounded The-
ory Method (GTM). The former assumes the reality of an external world, takes 
for granted a neutral observer, and views categories as derived from data. The 
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latter “recognizes that the viewer creates the data and ensuing analysis through 
interaction with the viewed” (CHARMAZ 2000, p.523), GTM is then a tool 
rather than a prescription.  
CHARMAZ is not prescribing the constructivist view as the only valid one, 
but she is making the case for a full and proper consideration of issues of con-
structivism as they impact upon some of the central – and oft-repeated – defin-
ing phrases of GTM. Many of these founding formulations make up the mantra 
of GTM, used by an overwhelming majority of articles by researchers reporting 
their use of GTM. Here are three representative examples – one from the origi-
nal GLASER and STRAUSS monograph, and one each respectively from later 
works by GLASER, and STRAUSS and CORBIN:  
- [T]he basic theme in our book is the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research. (GLASER & STRAUSS 
1967, p.2) 
- The first step in gaining theoretical sensitivity is to enter the research 
setting with as few predetermined ideas as possible – especially 
logically deducted [sic], a prior [sic] hypotheses. In this posture, the 
analyst is able to remain sensitive to the data by being able to record 
events and detect happenings without first having them filtered through 
and squared with pre-existing hypotheses and biases. (GLASER 1978, 
pp.2-3) 
- A researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in 
mind (unless his or her purpose is to elaborate and extend existing 
theory). Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows 
the theory to emerge from the data. (STRAUSS & CORBIN 1998, 
p.12)  
These statements, like many others, including those in GLASER’s recent re-
sponse to CHARMAZ, are objectivist – i.e. positivist – in the sense that repre-
sentation is seen as ultimately unproblematic once a neutral point of reference 
can be assured for the researcher. In the 1960s such assurances could be 
couched in the terms of accepted ideas about rigorous scientific method, and it 
is not surprising to note that the founding statements of GTM were couched in 
a clear and deliberate positivist view of scientific research. This was under-
standable given the dominance of such ideas in the 1960s, but it has become 
less comprehensible since then, given the extensive critiques of positivism that 
have emerged in the last 40 years. Any “guarantees” of neutrality these days 
can only be given once objectivist GTM can be seen to have engaged with the 
constructivist arguments.  
Now it may be that GLASER has addressed these issues elsewhere, but I am 
unaware of any such work by him or any other objectivist GTM people. 
GLASER’s response to CHARMAZ continues to indicate a position unin-
formed by what are now acknowledged to be key arguments about science, 
claims to knowledge, and representation that must be taken into account even if 
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only to be challenged and undermined or entirely refuted. If there is a persistent 
refusal to engage with such issues, then perhaps it indicates a fundamental 
conceptual weakness in GTM itself; something which the constructivist rein-
terpretations seek to remedy.  
At this stage I do not wish simply to repeat the sorts of argument made in 
CHARMAZ’s and my contributions – any interested readers will, I am sure, 
follow these up for themselves. The essential issues are that the positivist 
stance of a neutral observer, gathering data about the world, from which theo-
ries somehow emerge is now so severely discredited that one of the few places 
in which one can find such unreconstructed positivism is in the work of some 
of those claiming adherence to GTM – including, but not restricted to, Barney 
GLASER.  
Here is an example from the field of informatics, a paper by a group of re-
searchers studying Group Support Systems (GSS) in cross-cultural contexts. 
DE VREEDE, JONES and MGAYA offer their version of the GTM mantra as 
follows – and it is in no way exceptional in the GTM literature. “This approach 
[GTM] aims to develop inductively derived grounded theories about a phe-
nomenon. A grounded theory is not built a priori; rather, it emerges during 
study as data collection, analysis, and theory development occur in parallel.” 
(De VREEDE, JONES & MGAYA, 1999, p.205)  
What they mean by “in parallel” is not clear; but they almost immediately 
undermine the statement about emergence by noting that “data-collection ac-
tivities may be guided by relevant existing theories”. They try to offer some 
explanation and justification for what they mean by being “guided by ... rele-
vant existing theories”, arguing that it might be thought that their “data-
collection efforts could have been prestructured using research domain relevant 
theories such as the cultural theories of Hofstede or the TAM”. Given that they 
are obviously well aware of such theories, the authors reassure their readers 
that they took a conscious decision not to allow this knowledge to affect their 
work, “in order to avoid a standard way of thinking about the phenomena ob-
served”. How they managed this feat of cognitive evasion is not clear.  
Here is a view of cognition that is determinedly objectivist. Other theories, 
known to the observer can simply be discarded, assumptions can be reduced or 
dispensed with altogether. The phenomena can be observed from a totally 
neutral position by a dispassionate, passive observer. Cognitive reservoirs of 
previous experience and knowledge can be dammed, blocked or diverted – the 
imagery is theirs. The flow of “raw data” can be turned on and off like a tap; 
and categories and theory emerge from this neutral, passive observational prac-
tice – “we closely examined all collected data, broke them into discrete parts, 
and labeled these parts”. How the parts were identified is never explained. 
As a statement of GTM this is, unfortunately, unexceptional; as a statement 
about observation and theoretical insight it is naïve and misleading. Couched 
within a perspective that allows for theory to be “inductively derived”, it begs 
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far too many questions that have been at the centre of philosophy of science for 
at least the past 30 years. De VREEDE et al. give no explanation for what 
counts as “data” in their work. They see no problem with “induction”, despite 
the fact that it has been largely discredited in such a simplistic form. Their 
observational role is largely passive, yet they fail to explain how the data can 
be broken into “discrete parts” and how “categories could be identified”.  
GLASER in his response to CHARMAZ echoes the same themes. He states 
that “data is discovered”; and he may understand what is meant by “It just 
remains to be clear about the data that obtains and that is whatever it is”. Un-
fortunately he does not make it clear to the reader, and so at best the statement 
stands simply as an article of faith – “it is what it is”.  
So why then do the anti-objectivists bother with GTM? Why not simply jet-
tison the whole approach, leaving it to GLASER and his colleagues? The ar-
gument for the revising and reconceptualizing of GTM is best put by TURNER 
who characterizes GTM as an 
approach to qualitative data [that] promotes the development of theoretical ac-
counts which conform closely to the situations being observed, so that the 
theory is likely to be intelligible to and usable by those in the situations ob-
served, and is open to comment and correction by them. … The approach also 
directs the researcher immediately to the creative core of the research process 
and facilitates the direct application of both the intellect and the imagination 
to the demanding process of interpreting qualitative research data. It is worth 
noting that the quality of the final product arising from this kind of work is 
more directly dependent upon the quality of the research worker’s under-
standing of the phenomena under observation than is the case with many other 
approaches to research. (TURNER, 1983, pp.334-335, my emphasis, A.B.)  
Ultimately GTM is far too valuable a method to leave to the objectivists. If 
we look at what GLASER and STRAUSS actually did, rather than what they 
claimed – and continued to claim – they were doing, there is the basis for a 
powerful research approach. BASZANGER and DODIER (1997) term the 
method of GLASER and STRAUSS’ as one of “constant comparison”. They 
characterize it as a method “consisting of accumulating a series of individual 
cases, of analyzing them as a combination between different logics of action 
that coexist not only in the field under consideration, but even within these 
individuals or during their encounters”. The aim of such methods is generaliza-
tion rather than totalization, with the objective of producing “a combinative 
inventory of possible situations”.  
With such ideas in mind, I want to look at GLASER’s response in a little 
more detail – a sort of small-scale example of constructivist GTM. A close 
reading of the piece reveals a number of categories – which do not magically 
emerge, but arise from my particular reading of the article – just as GLASER’s 
reading of CHARMAZ’s article leads him to (re-) conceptualize her views in a 
particular way. (I accept the issue and inevitability of idiosyncratic readings; 
GLASER appears not to.) The categories that emerge are as follows.  
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GTM is held up in contrast to a largely undefined category of QDA – quali-
tative data analysis; whereas GTM is based around the statement “all is data”. 
Whatever QDA actually is, it is not based on this; but whether this means that 
QDA is based on something along the lines of “all is not data”, or “not all is 
data” is not clarified. The two categories, carefully placed in mutual opposition, 
seem to fill out largely from the data – i.e. GLASER’s own words – with the 
use of concepts such as “worrisome accuracy”.  
“Worrisome accuracy” is such a slippery concept – never defined or de-
fended – that its interest arises largely from the use made of it by GLASER, 
rather than any intrinsic meaning. Is GLASER arguing that GTM need not 
bother about accuracy? If so, what is the meaning of the key GTM terms of fit 
and relevance? How can they be judged other than on the basis of accuracy or 
propriety with regard to some criteria or baseline? It seems that GLASER uses 
the concept of worrisome accuracy simply in order to be able to drive a con-
ceptual wedge between GTM and QDA – a category forced on the reader by 
GLASER purely to act as a contrast to GTM. Furthermore this allows 
GLASER to cast aside the critiques mentioned by CHARMAZ, since they 
apply only to “descriptive capture” and “descriptive methods”, and have no 
engagement with GTM.  
A further category that emerges from GLASER’s response is that of ab-
stract agency. GLASER, correctly, sees the constructivist orientation as one of 
active involvement in the research process; although GLASER characterizes 
this in a disparaging fashion, using terms such as bias, passion, personal predi-
lections and so on. GLASER sees this as no part of GTM, and he allows him-
self the cheap jibe at CHARMAZ that “she thinks that way because she is a 
feminist”. (GLASER may counter that he only included this as an example – 
but it is telling that it is his only example in an under written response to a 
contribution from a woman. I leave it to the reader to judge if that is a forced 
conclusion or one that emerges.)  
The point about abstract agency, however, is crucial. GLASER makes sev-
eral points against QDA, constructivist GTM or whatever, along the lines that 
such approaches do not confront researcher bias. So how does GTM deal with 
this issue? GLASER states that GTM provides a method for discovering or 
conceptualization of latent patterns; but this begs the question that lies at the 
root of the constructivist critique of GLASER’s position – how does this dis-
covery or conceptualization take place? The constructivist position would 
argue that there is a dialogue between the researcher and the research subject – 
in both senses of the word “subject” – i.e. the person who is the concern of the 
research, as well as the research area itself. GLASER neatly evades this with 
fairly consistent use of forms of grammar that preclude or conceal this issue. 
Thus he gives abstract nouns the power of agency or action – e.g. “GT can use 
any data”, “Categories, which are concepts, … are constantly fitted to the data” 
(my emphasis, A.B). The researcher her-/himself, however, only has agency if 
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it is decided that such an issue “has relevance” – who makes this decision is 
left unstated.  
This leads on to the category of “data” itself – perhaps the pivotal issue. The 
constructivist position, like all those emanating from an understanding of the 
profound weakness of classic positivism, cannot accept anything along the 
lines of data as it is characterized by the original texts of GTM, and in particu-
lar by GLASER in his response. GLASER again sidesteps the issue with some 
complex and often strangely ungrammatical convolutions – thus he states that 
“data is discovered”; but by whom? He then argues that “[I]t just remains to be 
clear about the data that obtains and that is whatever it is.” If this can be ex-
cused as part of a rushed response, then the same cannot be said for the quote 
GLASER himself selects from his own book.  
‘All is data’ is a well known GLASER dictum. What does it mean? It means 
exactly what is going on in the research scene is the data, whatever the source, 
whether the interview, observations, documents, in whatever combination. It 
is not only what is being told … but also all the data surrounding what is be-
ing told.  
In other words, data is the data; and is also the process that goes on in cap-
turing the data; and is also anything in addition to the data itself – hardly the 
most helpful formulation.  
If this sounds as if I am being petulant and somewhat outlandish at 
GLASER’s expense, then it is largely a reflection of the frustration that I feel at 
GLASER’s comments. He provides the reader with very little to counter or 
clarify the arguments put forward by CHARMAZ. In fact what he does offer 
are a series of disjointed slogans that satisfy no one – “conceptualization not 
accurate description”, “conceptual reality does exist”, “GTM is not about de-
scriptive capture”, “the data is what it is”.  
What we need from GLASER is a sustained engagement with the ideas that 
saturate the category of constructivism. What we have got so far is a response 
that reads as if GLASER is more intent on establishing “The One True Church 
of GTM”, than he is in clarifying the conceptual foundations of the method. 
STRAUSS has been long cast out as an apostate. Anyone who uses GTM in a 
manner that GLASER finds “incorrect” will suffer a similar fate. GLASER will 
be the arbiter of what counts as GTM and who is best able to use it – blessed 
are those who can “conceptualize”, they will inherit GTM, the rest will have to 
be satisfied with QDA.  
Now if this is what GLASER really wishes to do, then so be it; but I would 
like to be able to rescue the key ideas of the method. GLASER may feel pro-
prietorial about GTM, he has a certain right to do so as far as the initial state-
ments are concerned; but he now has to acknowledge that GTM has outgrown 
his grasp. We have GLASER’s view of GTM – well-documented in his books 
and papers, but we also have several other views, including what I consider to 
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be a far more potent and coherent one that is well exemplified by the article by 
CHARMAZ. GLASER’s version of GTM is not the only game in town.  
Postscript – September 2006 
This paper was first drafted in 2002 and appeared in 2003. Since that time the 
literature on GTM has developed significantly, taking into account many of the 
issues raised in the earlier work of both Kathy CHARMAZ and myself. In 
particular CHARMAZ (2006) has published a key introductory text entitled 
Constructing Grounded Theory, a fluent and accessible guide for researchers 
wishing to use GTM. In addition we are in the process of preparing and editing 
an international handbook on GTM (BRYANT & CHARMAZ 2007), in which 
a wide selection of GTM practitioners and progenitors put forward their ideas 
about the nature, history and future potential for the method. 
Since writing the original article I have had the opportunity to meet Barney 
GLASER and to see him “in action” at one of his seminars; and although I still 
stand by the main points made in my original article, my understanding of 
GLASER’s position has been significantly enhanced. First and foremost his 
concern is to teach people about the method, and to engage with those using it 
so that they understand the full power of GTM. Unfortunately the popularity of 
the method works against his proprietorial concern: GTM is now used so 
widely and in such a wide variety of contexts and disciplines that any attempt 
to control the method, in the sense of maintaining one particular view, is bound 
to fail. It is a victim of its own success. This has the downside, in that many of 
those claiming to use GTM are simply giving their research the Grounded 
Theory label because it adds some air of validity or respectability to their work. 
But it also has the upside that many of those using the method can add their 
insights and experiences to a growing body of work that moves the method 
forward. The key is, of course, to distinguish between the two; something that 
can only be done by those prepared to engage with a wide range of literature 
and research. Moreover this is not something that can be done once-and-for-all; 
there has to be a constant dialogue between people using and learning about the 
method, and this will inevitably lead to divergences as has happened with other 
methods such as Action Research. 
In July 2005 I attended and contributed to the sessions chaired and organ-
ized by Barney GLASER as part of the Frontiers of Sociology Conference in 
Stockholm. When it came to my turn to present my ideas I did so with a series 
of powerpoint slides, each containing a different picture of a shark. This kept 
my audience amused and perplexed, until my final slide when I explained the 
relevance of the imagery. Borrowing and amending a quote from Woody Al-
len’s Annie Hall I concluded that “Methods are like sharks; they have to keep 
moving to stay alive … and we don’t want a dead shark on our hands”. 
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GLASER’s continuing commitment to GTM, and the work of others applying 
GTM and engaging with it in challenging ways is evidence of a progressing 
and developing method. 
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